This paper uses a monopolistic competitive framework to study the impact of trade liberalization on local and global emissions. We focus on the interplay of asymmetric emission taxes and the home market effect and show how a large-market advantage can counterbalance a high emission tax, so that trade liberalization leads firms to move to the large high-tax economy. Global emissions decrease when trade is liberalized in this case. We then simulate the model with endogenous taxes. The larger country, which has the advantage of the home market effect, will be able to set a higher Nash emission tax than its smaller trade partner, yet still maintain its manufacturing base. As a result, a pollution haven will typically not arise in this case as trade is liberalized. However, global emission increases as a result of international tax competition, which underscores that the importance of international cooperation increases as trade becomes freer. 
Introduction
An extensive literature explores the mechanisms through which trade can a¤ect the environment.
A topical concern is that trade liberalization allows …rms to locate production in countries with lower emission standards. While there is considerable theoretical support and an intuitive appeal for pollution havens, they have been hard to identify empirically, and the surveys by Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) …nd con ‡icting results across the literature. Recent studies using sector level data often …nd evidence of pollution havens in some sectors but not in others. 1 The present paper suggests a new set of theoretical reasons why it may be hard to empirically identify pollution havens. The analysis juxtaposes relative market size and asymmetric emission tax levels in determining the patterns of production and pollution. We use a twocountry monopolistic competition trade model with transboundary emissions generated from the production of manufactured goods and with pollution abatement by the …rm à la Copeland and Taylor (1994) . The model is speci…ed in terms of a transboundary pollutant, and we have greenhouse gas emissions in mind. 2 We assume that countries are identical except for their size and the emission tax they set to focus on e¤ects related to the monopolistically competitive framework. Thus, there is intra-industry trade (within industry trade) with di¤erentiated products, but no role for comparative advantage. In this type of framework, the number of …rms increases more rapidly than output as a country becomes larger. The reason for this is that …rms concentrate in the larger market to save on transportation costs. This e¤ect has been dubbed the 'home market e¤ect'(HME) by Helpman and Krugman (1985) . 3 At the same time, asymmetric emission taxes imply a pollution haven. Trade liberalization a¤ects the interaction between the HME and asymmetric emission taxes and the outcome of trade liberalization on global emissions will therefore depend on this interaction.
We …rst analyze a setting with exogenous taxes, and show how the HME dominates when the size di¤erence between markets is large, when abatement is easy, and when the degree of di¤erentiation between goods is high. When the HME dominates, trade liberalization will lead …rms to concentrate in the larger market. This decreases global emissions if the larger market has a higher emission tax. In contrast, the HME is weak when markets are relatively similar in size and trade liberalization will lead …rms to concentrate in the country with lower emission taxes leading to higher global emissions.
Then, we study a setting where emission taxes are set endogenously, and numerically simulate a Nash game between two governments. A government uses its market size advantage to set a higher Nash emission tax than its smaller trade partner, and yet maintain its manufacturing base. Trade liberalization therefore leads …rms to concentrate in the larger high-tax economy.
However, tax competition between the two countries is intensi…ed by trade liberalization, and this leads to lower taxes in both countries. Global emissions therefore increase in trade liberalization, even as …rms move to the high-tax economy, and welfare in both countries deteriorate for deeper levels of trade liberalization. We also simulate a Nash bargaining solution, which generates lower emissions and more benign welfare e¤ects. Thus, despite the potentially helpful role played by the HME in mitigating pollution havens, the simulations maintain the case for international cooperation on emission taxes. 4 Moreover, the gains from cooperation increase in the level of trade liberalization.
2 Absent welfare considerations, the analysis applies equally to local pollutants, as in the …rst part of the paper where taxes are exogenous. 3 The is a considerable empirical literature that documents the home market e¤ect. See e.g. Head and Ries (2001) , and Head et al. (2002) . 4 The simulation results with endogenous taxes are closely related to the large literature on environmental tax competition started by Markusen (1975) . This literature uses a di¤erent theoretical framework from ours but the conclusions are similar. See in particular Cremer and Gahvari (2004) . See also the surveys by Cremer et al. (1996) , Wilson (1999) and Hau ‡er (2001).
Our theoretical …ndings suggest a reason why pollution havens can be di¢ cult to identify empirically; namely, that the e¤ect of asymmetric emission taxes is dominated by the large market advantage in the high-tax economy. 5 Naturally, there are other explanations for the di¢ culty to identify pollution havens (for surveys of this literature, see Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) and Copeland and Taylor (2004) ). These explanations are generally related to some form of comparative advantage, that is, cases where the country or region has a comparative advantage strong enough to outweigh the costs associated with higher environmental standards. The dominating factor for …rm location also varies by sector. In some sectors, the standard comparative advantage may be the dominating force for location, e.g. in sectors that are very dependent on raw materials (paper, pulp, mining et c.) or in sectors with extreme factor intensities (textiles, apparel etc.). Other sectors may be more sensitive to market potential. In the next section, we employ data on FDI in ‡ows to US states from Keller and Levinson (2002) to illustrate the e¤ects of market size on …rm location. This is an example where di¤erences in factor prices are much lower than they would be when comparing countries, and market size should therefore be relatively important. This is con…rmed by our empirical example: the sensitivity of inward FDI to US states to abatement costs is highly dependent on the market size of the individual US states.
Interestingly, our results, derived in a model with intra-industry trade, imply a quali…cation of the results obtained by Copeland and Taylor (1995) where trade is inter-industry (between industries). They show how trade liberalization tends to increase global emissions if the income di¤erences between the liberalizing countries are large, as dirty industries expand strongly in the poor country with low environmental standards. Our results show that market size is also of importance: trade liberalization between similar countries (of similar size) may increase global emissions while trade liberalization between dissimilar countries can decrease global emissions if the larger country has a more stringent environmental regulation. If the rich country has a larger market, then the HME may induce …rms to stay despite higher emission taxes and trade liberalization may therefore decrease global emissions even if there is a large income di¤erence between the countries.
There is a large theoretical literature that analyzes trade and emissions within a neoclassical framework (see e.g. Copeland and Taylor (2003) , Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Antweiler et al. (2001) ). The importance of scale economies and imperfect competition for trade and emissions has generally been analyzed in an oligopolistic strategic setting (see e.g. Markusen et al. (1993) , Markusen et al. (1995) and Rauscher (1997) ).
A relatively smaller literature analyzes trade and the environment in models with di¤eren-tiated products and monopolistic competition. Gürtzgen and Rauscher (2000) examine transboundary pollution in a monopolistic competition framework with two countries and …nd that tighter environmental policies at home can lead to reduced emissions abroad. However, in con-trast to this paper, their model does not feature trade costs and the e¤ects of trade liberalization can therefore not be analyzed. Benarroch and Weder (2006) analyze a model of monopolistic competition with vertically linked industries. Trade liberalization induces the …nal good industry to use a higher share of imported intermediates, which implies that the "clean" country increases its imports of dirty intermediates and the "dirty" country increases its imports of clean intermediates. As a consequence, trade makes the dirty country cleaner and the clean country dirtier. P ‡uger (2001) analyzes local emissions using a monopolistic competition framework with internationally mobile capital à la Martin and Rogers (1995) . The e¤ect of trade liberalization is analyzed when countries are symmetric in size but have di¤erent emission taxes. Trade liberalization will bene…t the country with lower emission taxes as capital moves to that country.
Thereafter, an endogenous Nash emission tax rate is derived when countries are identical and there is free trade. It is shown that this equilibrium tax may be higher or lower than the e¢ cient one depending on parameters such as the emission share in production. The present paper instead analyzes trade liberalization when countries are di¤erent in size. We show how this size di¤erence gives rise to a home market e¤ect that can compensate for a higher emission tax when trade is liberalized. However, because of the asymmetric country size, our set-up does not allow for an analytically derived Nash tax rate, and we do instead simulate this case.
Another paper that uses the framework by Martin and Rogers (1995) is Ishikawa and Okubo (2016) . They study the di¤erent impacts of environmental taxes and quotas for the location of …rms as trade is liberalized.
Finally, Zeng and Zhao (2009) use a trade and geography model with capital, land and labor where pollution harms the productivity of the agricultural sector. Their focus is on how trade liberalization a¤ects the equilibrium location of footloose capital, and some of their results are driven by the HME, as in our model. Unlike Zeng and Zhao (2009) , we use a standard one factor Dixit-Stiglitz model with a transboundary pollutant. We also di¤er from Zeng and Zhao (2009) by including …rm abatement à la Copeland and Taylor (1994) , which makes the model easily analytically tractable, and moreover they do not consider endogenous emission taxes whereas we do.
Before proceeding to our model, we present an empirical example that highlights the potential importance of market size for pollution havens. We do not here test hypotheses derived from our model but present this purely as a motivational example.
An empirical example
We employ data from Keller and Levinson (2002) . They investigate how inward FDI in ‡ows to US states are a¤ected by di¤erences in manufacturers'relative pollution abatement cost (RAC).
Thus, we provide a limited description of the data. The same data has been used by Millimet and Roy (2016) who use an identi…cation strategy with instruments based on higher moments of the data to identify the pollution haven e¤ect. Splitting the sample into big and small states also indicates the importance of market size in determining the impact of other sources of comparative advantage included as control variables.
Comparing the estimated coe¢ cients in columns (2) and (3) shows that the negative e¤ect of 6 The results are the same if we use population. All regressions include state and year …xed e¤ects.
Standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered by state. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. All regressions include state and year …xed e¤ects.
Standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered by state. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
wages disappears for large states, and that the negative e¤ect of unionization is halved. The large market e¤ect dominates these sources of comparative advantage.
Endogeneity of the state level environmental stringency (RAC) is a concern. 7 We therefore, in Table 2 , replicate the Lewbel (2012) IV method by Millimet and Roy (2016) . 8 The IV regression results are very similar to those in Table 1 . Inward FDI ‡ows continue to be signi…cantly negatively related to environmental stringency for small states, but not for large ones.
The Model
This paper builds a two-country monopolistic competition trade model with emissions and abatement costs. The focus of the discussion is how tax rate di¤erentials interact with market size. The tax rates are initially set exogenously. Thereafter, we allow for endogenous emission taxes.
Basics
There are two countries, home and foreign, denoted by (j; m) 2 (h; f ), and two sectors denoted by A and M . Each country has a single primary factor of production, labor denoted by L, used in the A-sector and the M-sector. The A-sector is a Walrasian, homogenous-goods sector, which is costlessly traded. The M-sector is characterized by increasing returns, monopolistic competition and iceberg trade costs. M-sector …rms face constant marginal production costs and …xed costs, and production by …rms in the M-sector generates emissions of a transboundary pollutant. These emissions are a pure public bad in that emissions from any country a¤ect welfare in both countries. Governments in both countries levy a tax on pollution, which is redistributed in a lump-sum fashion to consumers. Consumers in each country have two-tier utility functions with the upper tier determining the consumer's division of expenditure among sectors and the second tier dictating the consumer's preferences over the various di¤erentiated varieties within the M-sector with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES).
All individuals in country j have the utility function
where C Aj is consumption of the homogeneous good, C M j is consumption of a CES-aggregate of di¤erentiated good, 2 (0; 1); and the function g(E w ) captures climate damages. g(E w ) is a function of global emissions generated by the M-sectors in the home and foreign countries,
Di¤erentiated goods from the manufacturing sector enter the utility function through the index C M j ; de…ned by
where n w is the global mass of varieties in the di¤erentiated goods sector, c i;j is the amount of variety i consumed by an individual in country j; and > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
The A-sector is subject to constant returns to scale and perfect competition. The unit factor requirement of the homogeneous good is one unit of labor. This good is freely traded and since it is chosen as the numeraire
w being the nominal wage of workers in all countries. Income in country j consists of wage incomes plus the redistributed emission taxes:
where t j is the emission tax and E j represents local emissions in country j:
Each consumer spends an overall share of his income on manufactures, and the demand for a variety i is therefore
where p i;j is the consumer price of variety i; and
is the price index of manufacturing goods.
Let us also account for the fact that manufacturing activity entails pollution in terms of emissions. 9 We follow Copeland and Taylor (1994) and assume that each …rm i produces two outputs: a manufactured good (x i;j ) and emissions (e i;j ). Governments in both countries levy emission taxes (production taxes). A …rm can reduce the emissions by diverting a fraction i;j of the primary factor, labor, away from the production of x i;j . Firms pay a …xed cost, and thereafter joint production is given by 9 We abstract from emissions related to the consumption of goods and only focus on supply-side emissions.
where l i;j is labor used in the variable cost term by …rm i; a is the labor input coe¢ cient, and 0 i;j 1. Firm-level emissions, given i;j ; are determined by the abatement function
which is characterized by ' i;j (0) = 1; ' i;j (1) = 0; ' 0 i;j (:) < 0; and 0 < < 1: 1 is a measure of the e¤ectiveness of the abatement technology. All …rms in country j are symmetric in equilibrium, and we therefore drop subscript i from now on. Using (9) and (10) to substitute for j in (8) yields
from which we derive the variable cost function. Substituting out j with the …xed cost being sunk, and choosing units of labor so that a = 1, we obtain the following cost function:
where (1 ) (1 ) , and F is a …xed production cost.
In country j, a …rm's demand for emissions (as input to production) is derived by applying Sheppard's lemma on the cost function:
which yields the emission intensity
Pro…t maximization by a manufacturing …rm in country j leads to the consumer price
in country m: Shipping the manufactured good involves a frictional trade cost of the "iceberg"
form: for one unit of a good from country j to arrive in country m, j;m > 1 units must be shipped. It is assumed that trade costs are equal in both directions, jm = mj , and that jj = 1; which allows us to drop the country subscript from trade cost, hence . Assuming free entry ensures that the equilibrium …rm pro…ts are zero. The operating pro…t, px M C x; must then equal the …xed cost F . Price is a constant mark-up on the marginal cost, which yields the equilibrium scale of a …rm in country j
Substituting the …rm's equilibrium output from (16) into (14) gives …rm-level emissions:
A higher emission tax and a more e¢ cient abatement technology (lower ) decrease …rms' emissions and emission intensity.
Equilibrium
Using (6) and (7), …rm pro…ts, p j x j ; can be written as
where 1 is the freeness of trade that varies between autarky ( = 0) and free trade
Substitute (17) into equations (18) and (19) at zero pro…t to obtain the global number of …rms, which is constant: a customary result of Dixit-Stiglitz models
The equilibrium values for n j are
where:
The model displays what Helpman and Krugman (1985) call a 'home market e¤ect'(HME).
That is, …rms do disproportionately locate to the larger market. The reason for this is that …rms save on transportation costs by locating production closer to centers of demand, i.e. in the larger market. The HME is ampli…ed by trade liberalization and may lead to the concentration of all manufacturing …rms in the larger market for su¢ ciently low trade costs. To illustrate the HME, consider a case where the emission taxes of the home and foreign country are symmetric,
This gives the share of …rms in the home country as a function of s L and
Di¤erentiating (23) with respect to s L yields
As the relative size of the home country increases, the share of …rms locating in the home country increases more than proportionately; this is the HME. Furthermore, as seen from (24), the steepness of dsn ds L increases in . Trade liberalization magni…es the HME. 10
Emissions
Local emissions in each country are from (17), (21), and (22) given by
; (26) and world emissions are given by
Clearly, a proportional increase in t h and t f , which keeps T constant, leads to lower emissions.
The e¤ect of trade liberalization on emissions
The analysis juxtaposes the impact of a varying market size and emission taxes. The size di¤erence gives rise to a HME, while the di¤erence in emissions taxes leads to a pollution haven.
Before examining the interplay of these forces, we characterize these mechanisms separately.
Symmetric taxes
Constrain emission taxes to be symmetric in the home and foreign country, t h = t f = t to isolate the HME. This means that trade liberalization will lead to a relocation of …rms to the larger market. At the same time, note that equation (17) suggests that …rm emissions are una¤ected by : It follows from this that emissions will increase in the large market and decrease in the small market, as trade is liberalized. More precisely, the shift of production to the larger market entails a proportionate shift of emissions. Substituting t h = t f = t into equations (25) and (26) 1 0 All …rms concentrate in the larger (home) country when trade liberalization reaches = 1 s s ; as seen from (23). The locational advantage of the larger market continues to increase as trade is liberalized beyond ; but eventually this e¤ect reverses and there is no locational advantage left at free trade. The relative attractiveness of the larger market (the HME) is therefore hump-shaped in the level of trade costs. However, the eventual weakening of the HME is not su¢ ciently pronounced to produce a relocation back to the small market, in this case with symmetric taxes. 
Di¤erentiation w.r.t. gives
which is always positive for s L > Global emissions under symmetric taxes are illustrated by equation (27) evaluated at t j = t;
This suggests that when taxes are symmetric, global emissions decrease in the emission tax rate and decrease in abatement e¢ ciency 1= : However, note that global emissions are independent of trade openness : 
Symmetric markets
Next we constrain market sizes to be identical in home and foreign (s L = 1 2 ); but allow the emission taxes to vary. The identical market sizes isolate e¤ects related to emission tax asymmetry.
The relative mass of …rms in the two markets now depends on the relative tax rates and the level of trade costs. Combining equations (21) and (22) yields the relative number of …rms in the home and foreign country
Rearranging equation (31) identi…es the range of relative taxes, T
+
In a totally symmetric economy, T = 1 and (31) reduces to n h n f = 1: A higher foreign tax implies a higher T; and from (31) this leads to a higher
Thus, a relative decrease in the tax rate of the home country leads to an increase in the share of …rms in the home country. This identi…es the pollution haven e¤ect (PHE): …rms ‡ee countries that raise their environmental standards.
The e¤ect of trade liberalization on the location of …rms is given by
and we can now formulate the following propositions:
Proposition 2 Trade liberalization always leads to a relocation of …rms to the low-tax country when markets are symmetric if f < q
+ ( 1) .
Proof: Let t h < t f : Then, T ( 1) T ( 1) > 0: The sign of the di¤erential in (33) now depends on the term ( 1) 2 ( ( 1) + ) ; which is positive if f < q Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 2 together with the fact that from (20), the global number of …rms is constant and from (17), …rm level emissions decrease in the emission tax rate.
Thus, starting from autarky, trade liberalization always leads more …rms to locate in the lowtax country. This e¤ect is labeled the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH). Trade liberalization in this case makes it easier for …rms to concentrate in the low-tax country, and since the global mass of varieties is always constant, it must be the case that trade liberalization leads to more emissions; that is, we have a pollution haven. This result is congruent with the neo-classical analysis (see Copeland and Taylor (2004) ).
What if trade costs are so low that > q ( 1) + ( 1) ? Further trade liberalization would then lead …rms to relocate to the high tax economy. However, there is an upper bound on for there to be …rms active in both countries, identi…ed by condition (32). Between these two conditions on , there can exist a parameter space for which deeper trade liberalization leads to e¤ects opposite of the PHH. 11
Asymmetric taxes and markets
We now turn to the case where both market size and taxes di¤er between the two countries: both s and T are unconstrained. Clearly, when the large economy has low taxes, the PHH and the HME tend to work in the same direction, and trade liberalization should therefore lead to higher global emissions. The perhaps more interesting case to investigate is under which conditions a large home market can outweigh higher emission taxes so that trade liberalization leads to lower emissions. We here focus the discussion on this latter case and analyze the conditions under which the HME can dominate the PHH.
Using (17), global emissions can be expressed as
From (20), n h + n f is constant so global emissions are for given taxes solely determined by the allocation of …rms between the two markets. It also follows that trade costs cease to a¤ect emissions once all …rms are concentrated in one market.
The share of …rms in home, s n n h n w follows from (20) and (21):
which suggests that the location of …rms is a¤ected by the relative tax rate T , but not by the level of taxes. On the contrary, emissions do depend on the level of taxes in addition to the relative tax rate.
The change in global emissions from a change in trade openness, as long as there are …rms in both countries, is given by di¤erentiation of (27):
The e¤ect of trade liberalization on emissions will depend on the counter-balancing interaction of the PHH and the HME. The PHH draws …rms to the small low tax market whereas the 1 1 The e¤ect is driven by the assumption that tax revenues are redistributed back to consumers. When …rms relocate into an economy, they boost tax revenues and therefore aggregate demand. This, in turn, creates an HME, which is particularly strong when taxes are high. The e¤ect would not occur if revenues e.g. were used for the production of a public good. For such a case, see the working paper version of this paper, Forslid et al. (2015) . HME draws …rms to the large high tax economy. Consider …rst trade liberalization starting at autarky ( = 0): The movement of …rms is in this case dictated by the sign of
Firms move to the large high tax economy at = 0 if
and to the small low tax economy if
The conditions clearly show how location is determined by …rms trading-o¤ relative market size and relative taxes. The two cases in (38) and (39) are illustrated in Figures 1A and 1B. Figure 1A shows a case where (38) holds so that HME initially dominates the PHH. The …gure plots world emission and the relative number of …rms from (27) and (35) On the other hand, with very low trade costs, …rms have no incentive to avoid trade costs.
Thus, the advantage of the large market is highest for intermediate trade costs, which implies that the HME is hump-shaped in . Trade liberalization in Figure 1A therefore …rst leads to lower emissions as the HME grows stronger, and more …rms are drawn to the high-tax economy.
When trade liberalization reaches the point where the HME weakens, further liberalization induces …rms to move away from the large high-tax country, which increases emissions. Finally, emissions remain constant once the trade costs are so low that all …rms remain located in the low tax economy. Both …gures show that the share of …rms in the large market declines for su¢ ciently free trade. This e¤ect depends on the fact that the HME is eventually weakened as trade is liberalized. We can show this property of the model by signing @sn @
at the point where all …rms have agglomerated in the low tax economy. This point is referred to as the sustainpoint in the economic geography literature. 14 Di¤erentiating (35) and solving for the trade freeness at which s n = 1 gives the trade freeness at the sustain point: 15
Note that this expression reduces to the standard solution 
Endogenous emission taxes: Simulations
So far, our analysis has shown that market size considerations can dominate the e¤ect of asymmetric emission taxes. Trade liberalization between a high-tax large economy and a low-tax small economy does not necessarily lead to the relocation of …rms to the low-tax economy. However, a pertinent question is whether this holds when taxes are set endogenously. Therefore, we introduce endogenous taxes, and maintain the assumption that tax revenues are redistributed to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. The combination of asymmetric markets and endogenous taxes cannot be handled analytically, and we therefore proceed by numerical simulation. We consider two settings: …rst, a non-cooperative setting where emission taxes are set in a Nash game between the two governments and second, a cooperative setting where emission taxes are given by a Nash bargaining solution.
Nash taxes
The government in each country chooses a domestic emission tax to maximize the utility of domestic residents from Equation (2), taking the tax rate of the other country as given. In the simulations, we use the following climate damage function:
where > 0 and 1 are parameters determining the importance of the disutility related to global emissions. This implies the following indirect utility of residents in Country j
where (1 ) (1 ) and y j w +
Home's and foreign's …rst order conditions, @V h @t h = 0; and
= 0 may be decomposed according to:
where " k;l is the elasticity of k w.r.t. l and the positive coe¢ cients a 1j
w e j ; a 5 E 1 w ;where j 2 (h; f ): Consider the e¤ect of an increase of t j : The …rst term picks up the negative income e¤ect stemming from lower tax revenues as …rms relocate to the other country.
The second term is a direct e¤ect on the price index, which increases since a higher domestic tax results in higher domestic prices. The third term shows the e¤ect of relocation on the price index. Relocation to the other country tends to lead to a higher domestic price index since more varieties are imported and thereby subject to trade costs. However, the e¤ect goes the other way if the foreign price (tax) is so low that it outweighs the trade cost. The fourth term shows the positive utility e¤ect of lower domestic emissions. Finally, the …fth term shows how the relocation of …rms a¤ects global emissions, and relocation to the other country decreases global emissions if the other country is a high tax country.
The …rst order e¤ect of trade liberalization can be seen from the third term in both Home and Foreign's …rst order conditions in (44) and (45), respectively. 17 Consider a case where home is large and has a higher emission tax at the outset when trade costs are high. Trade liberalization (a higher ) leads to a lower t h to balance the expression in the parenthesis, and it will for the same reason lead to a lower t f : This in turn gives rise to new rounds of feed-back.
As the foreign country lowers its tax rate the domestic economy must respond with a lower tax as seen from the third term in the FOCs. However, the response to a foreign tax reduction is muted by the fact that < 1, and the system therefore converges to a new equilibrium with lower taxes. It is also seen from the same expression that taxes must be more and more alike as approaches one. Thus, trade liberalization leads to falling and converging tax rates. Intuitively lower trade costs erode the advantage of the large market and therefore make it di¢ cult for the large country to have a higher emission tax than the small country. The e¤ect is also seen in the simulations below, where trade liberalization leads to falling and converging tax rates.
We start by simulating a case with a relatively strong HME, where the relative market size of the two countries s L = 0:65. The other parameters values are: = 4; F = 0:1; = 0:7; = 2; = 0:3; " = 0:1; L w = 100: We refer to these parameter values as our baseline case, and below we discuss the sensitivity of our results to varying parameters. Figure 2 . 18 Welfare is higher in the small country at autarky ( = 0). The small country adopts a low emission tax, because its emission tax has a relatively small e¤ect on global emissions. Thus, the small country is essentially free-riding on the emission reductions of the large economy, which leads to a higher welfare in the small economy. As trade is liberalized, the large country sharply decreases taxes to attract …rms, and as the HME leads to an increasing number of …rms in the large country, the large country welfare surpasses that of the small country. Our simulations show that the HME eventually outweigh the PHH in this type of model when taxes are set endogenously in a Nash game. Firms will eventually concentrate to the large economy even though it sets higher emission taxes. The simulations nevertheless show that global emissions increase as trade is liberalized.
Cooperative taxes: Nash bargaining
The Nash equilibrium tax game in the previous section does not yield Pareto e¢ cient taxes:
cooperatively set emission taxes raise the welfare in both countries. Negotiations between the two governments determine how the gains from cooperation are divided. We shall assume that the division of these gains is given by the Nash bargaining solution.
The Nash bargaining problem is
where V j is the welfare of country j de…ned in (43), and V N j is the welfare of country j at the disagreement point: in the absence of a negotiated agreement, the outcome is the noncooperative Nash equilibrium studied in the previous subsections. The larger country has bargaining power over the smaller country, which is captured by s L , the relative population size of the larger country.
The e¤ect of trade liberalization in the Nash bargaining solution when HME is strong (s L = 0:65) is reported in Figure 4 . All other parameter values used for this simulation are identical to those employed for the non-cooperative Nash case. Emissions are lower when taxes are set by Nash bargaining. Once more, the larger home country sets a considerably higher emission tax at autarky ( = 0) than the small country that has a more limited in ‡uence on world emissions. This is shown in Panel C. Therefore, welfare is higher in the small country at the autarky point (panel D). Trade liberalization leads to converging tax rates, but not to a race to the bottom as in the non-cooperative case. Global emissions therefore increase very little in trade liberalization (c.f. the non-cooperative case in Panel A in Figure 2 ).Trade liberalization eventually strengthens the HME enough to allow the large country to attract all …rms, which leads to signi…cantly higher welfare in the large country and lower welfare in the small country Simulation results for the case with a weak HME (s = 0:52) yield the same patterns, and they are therefore not reported. In sum, the simulations demonstrate that there is still a strong need for international cooperation on environmental taxes, despite the potentially helpful role played by the HME in mitigating pollution havens.
2 1 The other parameter values are unchanged from the simulations for the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Sensitivity analysis
How sensitive are our results concerning the e¤ects of trade liberalization on global emissions to the speci…c parameter values chosen? Figure 5 shows the e¤ects of a 20 percent increase in various key parameters of the model for both the non-cooperative and the cooperative outcomes with s L = 0:65: the baseline non-cooperative case reported in Figure 2 ; and the cooperative case reported in Figure 4 . Figure 5 Panel A shows the non-cooperative case. Here a higher increases the emissions.
A higher weakens the HME which pulls …rms to the large country, and this tends to increase the emissions since the larger country has higher emission taxes. However, it also dampens tax competition (because the value of having …rms located in your home market decreases), which tends to increase taxes and reduce emissions. In Panel A, the …rst e¤ect dominates and global emissions increase with a higher : Second, a higher implies that consumers are more sensitive to emissions which results in higher emission taxes and lower emissions. A higher ; in turn, will increase emissions because a higher share of consumer spending falls on the polluting M-sector.
Finally, a higher implies that abatement is less e¢ cient and global emissions increase as a consequence.
In Figure 5 Panel B, global emissions are lower with cooperatively set emission taxes. The outcome of an increase in the parameter values has the same sign as in the non-cooperative Nash case except for : Here, the increased taxes due to weaker tax competition dominate which means that a higher leads to lower global emissions. 
Concluding remarks
This paper uses a monopolistic competitive framework to study the impact of trade liberalization on local and global emissions. We focus on e¤ects stemming from tax di¤erences and di¤erences in market size and exclude comparative advantage e¤ects derived from di¤erences in factor intensities; our model only has one primary factor of production. We start by deriving analytical results with exogenous taxes, and thereafter turn to simulations with endogenous taxes.
With exogenously set emission taxes, we examine the e¤ect of market size and the e¤ect of asymmetric emission taxes separately. We …nd that trade liberalization does not a¤ect global emissions if taxes are identical in the two countries. In this setting, the HME induces …rms to locate to the larger market which, in turn, implies higher emissions in the larger market and lower emissions in the smaller market; however, global emissions remain constant. On the other hand, when countries are symmetric in size but emission taxes di¤er, trade liberalization tends to increases global emissions as …rms relocate to the low tax economy.
Then, we analyze the case with both the asymmetric market size and asymmetric taxes, relaxing the constraints on market size and emission taxes. Trade liberalization increases emissions when the HME and the PHH reinforce each other. This is the case when the larger country has a lower emission tax. As trade is liberalized, both the HME and the PHH draw …rms to the larger market which results in a higher global emission. However, trade liberalization may not result in increased global emissions when the HME and the PHH work against each other.
This happens when the larger country has a higher emission tax. If the HME dominates the PHH, trade liberalization will …rst result in a decrease in global emissions as …rms are drawn to the large high-tax economy, but later to an increase in emissions as the HME weakens for lower trade costs and the movement of …rms is reversed.
Then, we allow for endogenous emission taxes numerically simulating a Nash game between the governments. We show that, for su¢ ciently low trade costs, the PHH is always dominated by the HME in the Nash case. Even if …rms at early stages of trade liberalization are drawn to the small low tax economy, they eventually always relocate to the larger high-tax economy as trade is liberalized. This would seem to imply lower emissions. However, trade liberalization intensi…es tax competition between the countries, leading to lower emission taxes in both countries. Global emissions do therefore always increase in our simulations, even when …rms move to the high-tax economy, and welfare decreases for deeper liberalization as tax competition forces down emission taxes, thereby increasing emissions and climate damages.
We …nally simulate a case where taxes are set cooperatively by Nash bargaining. The larger country has a higher cooperatively set tax than the smaller country. Firms eventually relocate to the larger high-tax economy as trade is liberalized. However, in contrast to the non-cooperative case, tax competition is mitigated and, as a consequence, global emissions increase very little as trade is liberalized. Moreover, the level of global emissions is lower as compared to the Nash case. Moreover, the per capita welfare of the larger country increases monotonically as trade is liberalized. The per capita welfare of the smaller country falls with trade liberalization. These simulations demonstrate that there is still a strong need for international cooperation on environmental taxes, despite the potentially helpful role played by the HME in mitigating pollution havens. They also underscore that the importance of international cooperation increases as trade becomes freer.
It is not uncommon that a large country liberalizes trade with a smaller market with a laxer environmental standard. The fact that some studies fail to identify a pollution haven could be due to the fact that the larger market is large enough to attract …rms in spite of its stricter environmental standards, e.g. in the case of U.S. and Mexico. Our results also suggest that trade liberalization with a large economy with low environmental standards, such as China, may be particularly troublesome for global emissions.
